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The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 ended the blanket exclusion of immigrants based on 
race and created the foundation for current immigration law, but imposed a racialized 
immigration quota system and new ideological grounds for exclusion. 
 
June 27th marks the 52nd anniversary of the 
controversial 1952 Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), also known as the 
McCarran-Walter Act.1 The historical 
legacy of the Act is overwhelmingly 
negative, but also somewhat contradictory. 
The Act is justly vilified for creating a rigid 
immigration quota system based on national 
origins and racial categories. Yet, the Act 
also repealed the blanket exclusion laws 
against the immigration and naturalization 
of Asians, although it established only token 
quotas for Asian immigration and was 
clearly biased towards Europeans. While the 
national origins quota system was 
dismantled in 1965, other provisions of the 
Act  such as the creation of family and 
employment-based preference categories  
remain an integral part of U.S. immigration 
law to this day. The Act also redefined the 
ideological grounds for the exclusion and 
deportation of immigrants. Most of these 
provisions were formally repealed by 
Congress in 1990, but many were 
resurrected by the USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001. 
 
Immigration Policy at the Dawn of the 
Cold War 
 
The McCarran-Walter Act was a product of 
the dramatically changed international 
environment after World War II. It reflected 
not only the rise of anti-communist 
sentiment in the United States in the early 
Cold War era, but also the emergence of 
independent countries from colonialism after 
the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial 
Japan. Prior to the war, American 
immigration policy was designed 
specifically to exclude all Asians and 
peoples of color, restrict Southern and 
Eastern European immigration, and 
encourage the arrival of Western Europeans. 
The United States had been walled off to 
immigrants from Asia through a series of 
racist laws that included the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882, the Asia Barred 
Zone Act of 1917 (which denied entry to 
peoples from South and Southeast Asia and 
the islands of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, 
with the exception of the American 
possessions of the Philippines and Guam), 
the 1924 Immigration Act (which totally 
excluded the Japanese and other Asians 
from immigration and naturalization), and 
the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 (which 
reclassified all Filipinos as aliens and 
permitted only a 50 person annual quota). 
 
During World War II the U.S. government 
began to distinguish between friendly 
Asians and enemy Asians. Japanese-
Americans were deemed potentially 
dangerous and forced into relocation camps 
in 1942. In contrast, the Chinese, who were 
major allies against the Japanese, were 
rewarded by the 1943 Magnuson Act, which 
repealed the Exclusion Act of 1882 and 
lifted the racial bar against non-whites 
established in the Naturalization Act of 1790 
by permitting a small annual quota of 105 
Chinese immigrants and by making Chinese 
already in the country eligible for 
citizenship. With the end of the war, Asian 
colonies, such as the U.S.-governed 
Philippines and British-controlled India, also 
were permitted small immigrant quotas 
through the enactment of special exclusion 
repeal measures. However, the U.S.-
occupied Japanese were still banned from 
immigration, and the concept of the Asia 
Barred Zone was still extant in the law. 
 
After the War ended, the consolidation of 
Eastern Europe under the influence of the 
Soviet Union, the success of the communists 
in mainland China in 1949, and the outbreak 
of the Korean War in 1950 stimulated a 
fierce anti-communist backlash in the 
United States. Senator Paul McCarran (D-
Nevada), head of the Senate Judiciary 
Committees Internal Security 
Subcommittee, initiated an investigation of 
the administrations of Presidents Franklin 
Roosevelt and Harry Truman to search for 
communist infiltration. He promoted the 
McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950, 
which required American Communist Party 
members to register with the Attorney 
General. Title II of this Act used the 
wartime incarceration of Japanese 
Americans as a precedent for rounding up 
alleged subversives under loyalty clearance 
programs.2 President Truman vetoed the 
bill and, in comments reminiscent of 
contemporary opinions about the registration 
of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians, wrote 
that The basic error of this bill is that it 
moves in the direction of suppressing 
opinion and beliefthat would make a 
mockery of the Bill of Rights and of our 
claims to stand for freedom in the world.3 
Nevertheless, Congress overrode Trumans 
veto and the bill became law. 
 
The McCarran-Walter Act 
 
Two years after passage of the McCarran 
Internal Security Act, Senator McCarran and 
Congressman Francis Walter (D-PA), who 
would become chairman of the Committee 
on Un-American Activities in the late 1950s, 
teamed up to write the McCarran-Walter 
Immigration Act. Like McCarran's previous 
efforts, the legislation contained provisions 
aimed at subversion. In this case, it 
permitted the exclusion or deportation of 
any alien who engaged or had purpose to 
engage in activities prejudicial to the public 
interest or subversive to national security. 
Although the exclusion or deportation of 
aliens on purely ideological grounds was not 
a new concept in immigration law, the 
modern adaptation of this practice in the 
1952 Act would have a lasting effect. 
Despite a repeal of most ideological grounds 
for deportation by Congress in 1990, 
provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act have 
been used as recently as 2002 in the ongoing 
deportation cases against two Palestinian 
activists who as students distributed 
magazines and raised funds for a group the 
government later designated as a terrorist 
organization. Several courts have ruled that 
the deportations are unconstitutional because 
the men were not involved in terrorist 
activity.4 Moreover, the practice of 
ideological exclusion has been resurrected in 
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act that 
target aliens for deportation and exclusion 
based not on their actions but on their 
words, including words that would be 
protected under the First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution if spoken by U.S. 
citizens.5 
 
However, the McCarran-Walter Act was 
more than just another law directed against 
communists. It was also a conscious attempt 
to collect and codify the many existing 
statutes governing immigration and to 
reorganize the structure of immigration law. 
The Act retained the National Origin Quota 
System established by the 1924 Immigration 
Act, but expanded it to all countries and 
introduced the first system of visa 
preferences. This necessitated both the 
removal of previous bars to immigration 
from Asia and the imposition of numerical 
limits on immigration from Latin America 
and the Caribbean that had not existed 
before. However, the ethnic bias of the new 
system was clear: 70 percent of all 
immigrant slots were allotted to natives of 
the United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany, 
most of which went unused. The Act also 
created preferences within national quotas 
for immigrants with special skills and for the 
relatives of persons already in the United 
States (50 percent of a countrys quota were 
reserved for those highly skilled workers 
whose services were in short supply among 
the native labor force, while another 20 
percent were set aside for the spouses and 
unmarried adult children of permanent 
resident aliens), thus establishing the basis 
for todays employment-based and family-
sponsored preference categories.6 In 
addition, the Act detailed grounds and 
procedures for exclusion, denaturalization, 
deportation, and relief from deportation.  
 
On the basis of its discriminatory national 
quota provisions, the legislation was 
opposed by organizations such as the 
American Jewish Congress, American 
Jewish Committee, National Council of 
Jewish Women, Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society, and Association of Immigration and 
Nationality Lawyers (which became the 
American Immigration Lawyers 
Association). In Congress the fight against 
the bill was led by several prominent Jewish 
members including Rep. Emanuel Celler and 
Rep. Jacob Javits, who argued that the law 
would put a legislative seal of inferiority on 
all persons of other than Anglo-Saxon 
origin.7 President Truman vetoed the bill 
despite the recommendation of the 
Department of State,8 explaining that it 
would create a second-class status by 
dividing citizens by birth and citizens by 
naturalization. But Congress overrode the 
veto by a vote of 278-113 in the House and 
57-26 in the Senate, and the bill became 
Public Law No. 82-414  the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA). 
 
In 1953 Truman convened a presidential 
commission to investigate the social and 
political implications of the INAs national 
origins quotas.9 This Presidential 
Commission on Immigration and 
Naturalization (PCIN) recommended 
relaxing the security provisions of the 
McCarran-Walter Act, a stance supported by 
the Communist Party of the U.S.A. 
McCarran later accused PCIN of containing 
communist sympathizers and stated that 
subverting the national origins system 
would, in the course of a generation or so, 
tend to change the ethnic and cultural 
composition of this nation.10 
 
A Mixed Bag for Asian Americans 
 
The provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act 
that lifted the bars to immigration and 
naturalization for Asians and Pacific 
Americans were sponsored by the famous 
China hand, Republican representative Dr. 
Walter H. Judd. These provisions eliminated 
the 1917 Asiatic Barred Zone and all 
exclusionary acts against Asian nationalities, 
but replaced them with a territorial concept 
called the Asia-Pacific Triangle. 
Immigration of people indigenous to the 
Triangle was capped annually at just 2,000, 
while each Asian country within the 
Triangle was permitted a mere 100 
immigrants. Adding to the restrictiveness of 
these provisions, a person of Chinese 
descent who was a native resident and 
citizen of France would be counted toward 
the 2,000 person Triangle ceiling. This racial 
attribution rule applied exclusively to 
Asians.  
 
The Asian American community was 
divided in its reaction to the McCarran-
Walter Act, and remains so to this day. For 
instance, the Japanese American Citizens 
League (JACL), the oldest Asian American 
civil rights organization (founded in 1929), 
lobbied for the inclusion of a provision 
under which the Japan-born issei (first 
generation) were permitted to immigrate, 
and U.S.-born Japanese-Americans could be 
naturalized. Although some Japanese-
Americans objected to the provision because 
of the token quotas it established, the JACL 
still proudly claims that it led the efforts to 
pass the act which finally lifted the bar 
against Japanese immigrants and allowed 
Asian immigrants to become naturalized 
U.S. citizens. Other Asian-Americans, such 
as Professor Lisa Lowe, believe the Act 
racialized Asians because it was not 
racially neutral.11 Journalist Phil Tajitsu 
Nash writes: Not until the comprehensive 
overhaul of our immigration laws in 1965 
did this explicit racial discrimination against 




The fight to overturn the national origins 
quota system in the 1952 INA began as soon 
as the law was passed. Soon after its 
enactment, the prominent Harvard historian 
of immigration, Oscar Handlin condemned 
the Act for its racist xenophobia and token 
quotas for Asians and West Indian Blacks.13 
The Immigration Act of 1965 replaced 
quotas based on national origin with a 
uniform annual cap on immigration of 
20,000 per country. Nevertheless, many 
other aspects of the McCarran-Walter Act 
live on, ranging from the centrality of family 
and employment-based preferences in U.S. 
immigration law to the exclusion and 
deportation of immigrants on the basis of 
beliefs. The Act was an important, historic 
piece of immigration legislation, although 
only an imperfect step toward ending 
discrimination based on race in U.S. 
immigration policy.
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